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A THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW UNDER
CONDITIONS OF RADICAL JUDICIAL ERROR
Eric A. Posner*

Ian Macneil famously argued that earlier contracts scholarship followed a "neoclassical model," according to which contracts are understood
to be discrete, one-shot exchanges. Two strangers approach each other,
bargain, exchange promises, and either discharge those promises or breach.
If a dispute occurs and a lawsuit is filed, the court determines whether a
breach has occurred and awards damages based strictly on the contract, together with any evidence of negotiations that sheds light on the parties'
contractual intentions. Macneil introduced a new model, the "relational
model," under which contracts are analyzed as elements of relationships.
The relationships are not governed by contractual intentions, but reflect a
variety of influences, including social norms and the norms of conduct that
develop within the relationship. The parties understand their contracts
within the context of their relationship, and it seems that courts do too,
whether or not they make this explicit. Macneil has argued that the relational model is the more accurate and useful method, and has urged other
scholars to adopt this view.1
To some extent, events have vindicated Macneil's views, but the reality is complex.2 Initially, it must be stressed that the earlier scholarship was
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Thanks to Omri Ben-Shahar, Richard Craswell, and
participants at Relational Contract Theory: Unanswered Questions, the Symposium at Northwestern
University School of Law where a version of this Article was presented on January 29, 1999. I would
also like to thank the John M. Olin Fund, the Sarah Scaife Foundation Fund, and the Ameritech Fund in
Law and Economics for financial support.
I Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment ofLong-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,Neoclassical,and Relational ContractLaw, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854 (1978).
2 In particular, it is hard to believe that the neoclassical model, to the extent that it overlaps with the
standard economic approach, has been exhausted. A sample of recent work along these lines includes
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 94 YALE L.J. 97 (1989) [hereinafter FillingGaps]; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liabilityfor Breach of Contract: The Rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargainingand
the Economic Theory of ContractDefault Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990); Paul G. Mahoney, Contract
Remedies and Options Pricing,24 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1995); Thomas J. Miceli, ContractModification
when Litigatingfor Damages Is Costly, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 87 (1995); Eric A. Posner, Contract
Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the UnconscionabilityDoctrine, Usury Laws, and Related
Limitations on the Freedom of Contract, 24 J.LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995) (restrictions on contractual
freedom); Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL.
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not monolithic. Legal realists like Karl Llewellyn understood that contracts
occurred within relationships, and that powerful social norms may play a
greater role in regulating contracts than the law does,3 an idea illustrated by
a well-known article published by Stewart Macaulay some years later. In
addition, much modem contracts scholarship, while not explicitly embracing Macneil's approach, clearly shared his concerns.
To illustrate, consider some of the law-and-economics work of the
1970s. Goldberg argues that the relational contract approach differs from
the neoclassical approach by acknowledging that (1) information is imper-

fect and costly, (2) people engage in opportunism, and (3) outsiders (the
courts) will not necessarily enforce agreements accurately.5 Now these
ideas were all firmly established in the law-and-economics work of the late
1970s and early 1980s. The work on contract damages by Steven Shavell
and others assumed that the parties could not anticipate at zero cost every
contractual contingency, and that this is why courts must fill in contractual

gaps by awarding damages. 6 All law-and-economics work assumed that

people would engage in opportunism, for example, breaching rather than
performing if their gains from breach exceeded their costs of performance,
regardless of the loss imposed on the promisee. The debate between Kronman, Schwartz, and others about the desirability of specific performance
turned, in part, on how accurately courts could determine the promisee's
loss as a result of the breach of contract.7 So the debate was explicitly
about the accuracy or inaccuracy of the courts.8
INTERDISC. L.J. 389 (1994); Lars A. Stole, The Economics of LiquidatedDamage Clauses in Contractual Environments with PrivateInformation, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 582 (1992) (penalty doctrine); Eric
Talley, Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, and the LiquidatedDamages Rule, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1195 (1994); Alexander J. Triantis & George G. Triantis, Timing Problems in ContractBreach
Decisions, 41 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1998) (options approach to contract damages); Avery Wiener Katz, An
Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract,66 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1999) (guaranty contracts). Some
other examples are cited below.
3 For Macneil's acknowledgment, see Ian R. Macneil, The Many
Futures of Contract,47 S. CAL. L.
REV. 691,734 n.131 (1974).
4 Karl Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-AnEssay in Perspective,
40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931); Stewart
Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963).
5 Victor P. Goldberg, Relational Contract, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW 288 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
6 See, e-g., Steven Shavell, DamageMeasuresforBreach of
Contract,II BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980).
7 See, e.g., Anthony Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV.
351 (1978); Alan
Schwartz, The CaseforSpecific Performance,89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979).
8 In fact, all of these ideas appeared in articles by economists
going back into the early 1970s, work
from which much of the law-and-economics literature derives. The economic literature on "incomplete
contracts," which parallels the legal work on relational contracts, has its roots in this earlier work. See
Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, The Theory of Contracts,in ADVANCES INECONOMIC THEORY 71-155
(Truman Bewley ed., 1987). See also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975). For Macneil's views, see Ian R. Macneil, Economic
Analysis of ContractualRelations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich ClassificatoryApparatus,"
75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1018, 1039 (1981) [hereinafterEconomic Analysis].
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Still, this work has a different flavor from the more recent work by
scholars involved in law and economics. The recent work, more so than
earlier work, reflects Macneil's focus on problems arising from long-term
or relational contracts. Long-term contracts raise a straightforward, but
seemingly intractable problem: in the long term events are so hard to predict, that parties will not be able to allocate future obligations and payments
in a way that maximizes the value of their contract. They will have to anticipate renegotiation as the future reveals itself, but if the parties expect to
renegotiate, then they cannot bind themselves to a contract, in which case
the party whom events throw in the vulnerable position will be at the mercy
of the party whom events favor. Yet somehow parties in the real world
manage to overcome these problems. Relational contracts are popular and
effective, yet not (apparently) because parties can draft a relatively complete contract that a court will be able to enforce. On the contrary, if the
parties have a dispute, and go to court, they cannot expect the court to enforce contractual obligations on the basis of the initial contract, given that
the initial contract will most likely have nothing to say about events occurring many years later.
One of Macneil's contributions was to help legal scholars to see that
the traditional model, however convenient it was from a methodological
perspective, was simply inadequate for analyzing this important side of
contractual behavior. But having acknowledged this, we must proceed with
some sort of analysis. If Macneil is right, and courts cannot resolve contractual disputes by discovering initial contractual intentions on the basis of
documents and other evidence, cannot use such intentions (even if they exist) to guide behavior late in the life of a relational contract, cannot enforce
contracts in a way that maximizes their value ex ante, cannot fill in gaps by
imagining the hypothetical bargain-then what should the courts do?
There are now three main answers in the literature. Macneil's original
answer was the most ambitious. He argued that courts should enforce relational contracts by determining what the norms of the relationship are and
enforcing those norms. Macneil clearly had in mind something different
from, say, the norms that maximize the value of the contract or of the relationship, appealing instead both to generalized norms of fairness and the
particular norms of behavior that develop within the relationship. 9
Goetz and Scott argued that courts should enforce relational contracts
by filling the gaps with whatever terms would maximize the value of the

9 See, eg., IANiR MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980); Macneil, Economic Analysis,
supra note 8; Ian R Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 340, 38389 (1983). An interesting application is Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under
Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 369, 370-81 (1981). There is also a flavor of this approach in Gillian Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchisingand the Law of Incomplete Contracts,
42 STAN. L. REv. 927 (1990).
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contractual relationship.'0 This may sometimes be straightforward. When
there is a good market for substitute performances at the time of breach, the
court can determine damages correctly by using market price as a measuring rod. But more often, this would be highly complicated. Everything has
changed since the contract was signed, the parties have relied on each other
in various ways-having made investments specific to the relationshipand understandings have changed. If the seller has made a large relationship-specific investment in the manufacture of a particular widget, and the
buyer refuses to pay for it, the fact that the market in the meantime has
developed a cheap substitute is irrelevant for determining the proper
damages.
Schwartz has recently argued that courts should, on the contrary, enforce
long-term (or relational) contracts in a literal or "passive" way." Suppose
that a contract says that the seller must deliver at time X, and the buyer
must pay price Y, every month over the course of years, with no provisions
for change in circumstances. But circumstances change radically, so that
continued performance is disastrous for one party and a windfall for the
other. Schwartz argues that the courts should nonetheless enforce the contract as written (indeed, should enforce it through specific performance, not
damages). The parties, after all, know that circumstances might change.
But if they expect to have private information, so that courts cannot reliably
enforce the value-maximizing terms, then allowing judges to try to figure
out these terms would simply produce error. Literal enforcement also produces error, in the sense that judges would not enforce the hypothetical
value-maximizing terms. But at least this error would be predictable. And
predicting it, the parties will design the contract in such a way that provides
each side with the best incentives to engage in value-maximizing renegotiation when events finally change. In particular, the parties will choose
terms that are based on information that they believe the court will be able
to verify (such as market prices of inputs) rather than on information that,
even if economically more relevant, they anticipate the court will not be
able to verify (such as the seller's costs or the buyer's demand). Courts
benefit parties more, this argument concludes, by submitting to their contractual instructions-instructions which are designed precisely with the
courts' abilities in mind-than by flailing away in a fruitless attempt at di10 See Charles Goetz and Robert Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089
(1981); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rulesfor Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL

STUD. 597 (1990). Robert Cooter takes a position midway between Goetz and Scott, on one hand, and

Macneil, on the other, arguing that courts should, under certain conditions, identify and apply prevailing
commercial customs in order to resolve contractual disputes, and that these customs will generally be
efficient. Robert Cooter, StructuralAdjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 215 (1994).
11 See Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts,in THE NEW PALGRAVE DIcrTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed.,1998); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contractsin the Courts: An Analysis ofIncomplete Agreements and JudicialStrategies,21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992).
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vining the parties' contractual goals, or the optimal terms, or the norms of the
relationship.
These theories can be compared according to the attitude they take toward the competence of the courts. Macneil's theory places great confidence in the courts. He assumes not only that they will be able to
understand the nature of the dispute, but also that they will be able to do a
kind of sociological analysis of the parties' relationship. Goetz and Scott
place less confidence in the courts, but still give them a difficult task. The
courts must be able to determine what actions are value-maximizing when
the dispute arises, a determination that would require quite an exhaustive
understanding of the relationship, including who made relationship-specific
investments, how much each party contributed to the value generated by the
relationship, and so on. Finally, Schwartz places little confidence in the
courts. They only have to enforce the contract literally, which means reading the meaning of the contract off its face while ignoring evidence from
the prior and subsequent relationship.
Among these authors, Schwartz is most explicit about the assumptions
one must make about judicial competence. He points out that identifying
the value-maximizing action in any contractual relationship is likely to require information that is not available to the court. One or both of the parties may understand that the seller should slow down production or the
buyer should accept a delay, but courts, which are complete foreigners to
the relationship and to the industry in which it exists, are not likely to have,
or be able to obtain, the information that is necessary for this understanding.
That is why Schwartz limits the role of courts when enforcing relational
contracts.
But one might have doubts about whether Schwartz goes far enough.
Having relieved the court of the impossible burden of choosing the optimal
contract ex post, he places this burden squarely on the shoulders of the parties ex ante. There is a literature on the design of contracts that describes
the optimal terms in cases such as this.12 Schwartz himself relies on this literature in order to justify his proposal. But the optimal terms identified by
the literature are far more complex than those used in real contracts, and the
for which these terms are a solution is too
reason may be that the problem 13
solve.
to
people
real
for
complex
This leaves us with two possibilities. The first is that there are relatively simple ways for parties to design relational contracts in a way that
exploits courts without putting too big a burden on them. The second is that
12 See, eg., Oliver Hart and John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation,56 ECONOMETRICA
755 (1988); Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey, RenegotiationDesign with Unvenfiable Information, 62 ECONOMEMRICA 257 (1994); Aaron S. Edlin and Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, StandardBreach Remedies, and OptimalInvestment, 86 AM. ECON. REv. 478 (1996).
13 See Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner, and Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and Interpretationof
Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2000).
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parties lack the clairvoyance needed to give courts the proper guidance if a
dispute arises, and courts lack the genius that would be needed to enforce
contracts properly in the absence of such guidance. The latter possibility is
the one that I will explore in this paper. In a phrase, I assume that courts
are radically incompetent when it comes to meeting the demands that are
placed on them by relational contracts. They cannot even engage, reliably,
in the minimalist enforcement that Schwartz assigns to them.
Some might argue that because contract law exists, and parties freely
take steps to ensure that their agreements are legally enforceable, it must be
the case that courts are not radically incompetent. If they were, people
would abandon the formal legal system. In this paper, I argue, on the contrary, that even if courts are radically incompetent, people would still voluntarily enter legally enforceable contracts. Indeed, I go farther and argue
that many elements of our legal system make most sense if we understand
them to be a response to the regrettable but unavoidable fact that our courts
are incompetent when it comes to enforcing contracts.
I should immediately add some words of caution. I do not believe that
courts always misunderstand contracts, though I do believe that they often
do. But it is useful, for analytic and expository purposes, to take the extreme case and then generalize by relaxing the assumption that the extreme
case is always true.

I.

EMPIRICAL MOTIVATION

Merchants must cooperate with each other in order to make profits, but
cooperation is hampered as always by incentives to cheat. The long history
of commercial behavior is powerful evidence that merchants can overcome
these incentives much of the time-enough of the time, anyway, to be able
to prosper--despite the absence of legal intervention. One might mention
the Lombard and Jewish bankers in the early modem period, the Maghribi
traders, the Genoese and the Venetian merchant communities, ethnic Chinese merchants in foreign countries, Korean and other immigrant groups in
the United States, the successful exploitation of common pools by local
groups, and so on. 4 In all of these cases, merchants and others cooperate
and prosper in a lawless environment at the international level or even in a
hostile local legal environment. So one might ask, why is a state necessary
at all for commercial cooperation?
14 See, eg., JANET T. LANDA, TRUST, ETHNICTY AND IDENTITY: BEYOND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL

ECONOMICS OF ETHNIC TRADING NETWORKS, CONTRACT LAW, AND GIFT EXCHANGE (1994); ELINOR
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:

THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECIVE ACTION

(1990); Avner Greif, ContractEnforceability and Economic Institutionsin Early Trade: The Maghribi
TradersCoalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993); Avner Greif et al., Coordination,Commitment, and
Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild, 102 J. POL. ECON. 745 (1994); Eric A. Posner, The
Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHl-.
L. REV. 133 (1996) [hereinafter Posner, Regulation of Groups].
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A common answer is that relatively small and homogenous groups of
people can cooperate, whereas strangers cannot. This answer cannot be the
whole story. Most people who belong to the majority population in a state
are able to cooperate without resorting to the threat of legal sanctions. In ordinary life, people constantly make and keep promises; and legal retaliation
for cheating is never an option because the cost of invoking the law exceeds
the amount at stake. The ordinary wisdom might be revised, then, to hold
that nonlegal cooperation occurs among people in communities, where information flows freely and reputations are known, but not among strangers.
Even so revised, however, this view is unsatisfactory. What are these
contracts among strangers? When a consumer purchases a stereo at a retail
outlet, the consumer and the "store"--whether we mean the salesclerk, the
manager, or the shareholders-are strangers, but it is rare for a consumer to
sue the store if the stereo is broken. No rational consumer would sue a
store over an object worth a few hundred dollars, when the lawsuit would
cost the consumer thousands of dollars. But a lawsuit is rarely an issue,
anyway; the consumer will return the stereo and receive a refund or additional merchandise. Most retailers offer warranties and honor them because
they fear damage to their reputation. If the consumer does not honor a
promise to pay for the stereo, the retailer might sue the consumer, but more
likely it will report him to a credit agency that will record the default on the
consumer's credit report. Lawsuits do not occur, regardless of who
breaches. So the retailer and the consumer are not really strangers, or if
they are, then they embarrass the claim that nonlegal cooperation does not
occur among strangers.
Perhaps, then, the notion of "contracts among strangers" refers to
arm's-length sales among merchants. Even here, however, reputation and
other nonlegal mechanisms play an important role. Most merchants belong
to trade associations, clubs, and other organizations, which enable them to
meet each other and exchange gossip. A large company may have thousands of employees, but all the employees with major responsibilities will
join clubs or attend conventions where they meet their counterparts in other
firms. So what appears to be an arm's-length contract between two anonymous firms is often the result of negotiations between two friends who belong to the same social club or sit on the board of the same charitable
organization. An enormous amount of business activity consists of making
contacts, or "networking," and what does such contact consist of if not revealing information about oneself to others, and obtaining information
about them in return?
One can go farther. Parties to a contract are almost never anonymous.
In almost all contracts, one party or both parties care deeply about their
reputations. In ordinary commercial contracts between merchants, both
merchants expect to do business with each other in the future, or at least
with other merchants who are likely to learn about the behavior of the parties. Banks lend money to firms in the expectation that the firms will return
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for credit in the future, an understanding often represented formally by a revolving credit contract. Employers and workers understand that employment contracts cannot describe all the behavior that will be required on each
side. Workers behave properly in order to obtain bonuses and promotions
and in order to avoid being penalized or fired. Employers behave properly
in order to maintain the loyalty of their workers and to attract workers entering the market. Firms invest a vast amount of money in making themselves known to consumers, so that if a consumer has a satisfactory
experience he will come back, and he will tell his friends about it. 15 Airlines, department stores, and other businesses enable consumers to build up
a reputation as a repeat player by offering benefits like frequent flyer programs (in the first case) and credit cards (in the second case), which allow
the business to keep track of its customers and reward those who continue
to patronize it. Museums offer memberships in order to distinguish repeat
customers from occasional customers. Even something as transitory as a
stock transaction is constrained by nonlegal sanctions. The buyer and seller
in the secondary market do not deal with each other. They both deal with a
middleman, the broker, who takes pains to develop a reputation for honesty,
and who usually is employed by a firm with a brand name, built up over
years.
So when contracts are small, people do not sue each other because it is
not worthwhile. When contracts are large, people do not sue each other because they depend on reputation. But if this is so, what is the role of the
law? One can put this question differently. If the law were adequate for
regulating relations among strangers, then why wouldn't people rely on the
law rather than spending so much time and effort establishing their reputations for trustworthiness and learning the reputations of others?
The traditional or neoclassical paradigm of contractual behavior is not
well-equipped to answer these questions. 16 This approach generally assumes that people make contracts because only legal sanctions will deter a
party from cheating on the contract when it is profitable to do so. If each
party expected the other to cheat under such conditions, parties would not
enter a contract in the first place. The value-maximizing court enforces
contracts in such a way that maximizes the ex ante value of the contract,
which usually means allocating obligations in a way that places the risk of
any contingency on the party that can most cheaply bear it and that gives the
parties proper incentives to breach, invest, and engage in related behavior.
Other kinds of behavior are hard to explain if one assumes the traditional paradigm. Contracting parties are often friends. Friendships arise
not as the natural byproduct of time spent together and mutual interest; on
is See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance,89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
16 But see Louis A. Komhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L. & ECON.
691 (1983).
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the contrary, parties spend a great deal of effort, time, and money trying to
make friends. A book publisher might take a client out to lunch or dinner.
Purchasing agents take suppliers to baseball games, plays and movies, even
to strip-tease joints.17 Business deals are everywhere forged in bars, restaurants, and private drinking clubs. Business is almost always conducted in a
highly social manner. First, they talk about sports; then, about their families; and only then, perhaps when the dinner or golf game is almost over, do
they shake hands on the deal.
In the cotton industry, for instance,
Merchants take mill buyers on hunting trips just like in any other business ....
In the process, relationships... developfl. Over time a buyer gets the idea that
he wants to deal with me not just because of our business relationship, but also
because of our personal relationship. So you tell me, when you want
18 to do
business who will you call, the guy you like or the guy you don't like.
A major trade association "has sponsored the local debutante ball, an annual
civic cotton carnival, golf tournaments, a Cotton Wives Club [sic], a wellknown domino tournament, and numerous other civic events. To this day it
continues to encourage social interaction among its members and their families by making its annual conventions family events."1 9 Many businesses,
trade associations, and other industry groups sponsor social and family events
in order to enhance relationships among their employees or members.
If, as I will shortly argue, these phenomena arise because merchants
want nonlegal sanctions to substitute for the law, one must ask, what is
wrong with the law? Scholars acknowledge the possibility that the law is
just not very effective at regulating commercial transactions, but, as we
have seen, they limit the consequences of this possibility by sharply distinguishing between relational contracts and one-shot contracts. If courts cannot determine obligations in long-term, "relational" contracts, contracts in
which many terms are left out, they can determine obligations in shorter
"one-shot" deals.20
This latter claim is difficult to confirm or deny, but let me mention two
reasons why it is unlikely to be true. First, although the number of unpredictable contingencies that can change the value of a long-term relationship
is no doubt enormous, the number of unpredictable contingencies that can
change the value of a one-shot deal is also enormous. The overwhelming
variety of contingencies in the first case does not imply that courts can handle the variety of contingencies in the second case. The relatively "one17 Robyn Meredith, Strip Clubs UnderSiege as Salesman'sHavens,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,1997, at Al.
"SLisa Bernstein, Pnivate CommercialLaw in the Cotton Industly: Value Creation Through Rules, Norms,
and Institutions,at 16 (unpublished manuscript) (quoting merchant, brackets and ellipses in original).
19 Id. at 20-21.
20 See Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, supra note 11.
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shot" sale of a house extends over months during which any number of
things can happen, only a small fraction of which can adequately be treated
in the contract. Short-term contracts almost always have tails stretching indefinitely in the future. A buyer might sue the seller for a defect in goods
discovered months or years after delivery, a suit that requires the court to
determine whether any intervening contingencies are relevant for the determination of obligations.
A second reason for skepticism regarding courts' ability to determine
obligations in one-shot deals is that courts have trouble understanding the
simplest of business relationships. This is not surprising. Judges must be
generalists, but they usually have narrow backgrounds in a particular field
of the law. Moreover, they often owe their positions to political connections, not to merit. Their frequent failure to understand transactions is welldocumented. One survey of cases involving consumer credit, for example,
showed that the judges did not even understand the concept of present
value.2 ' The judges struck down contracts because the credit price was
higher than the cash price, not taking account of risk or the time value of
money. The authors showed that the implicit interest rates were reasonable.
Even when judges do not misunderstand basic ideas, we must take their interpretation of facts on faith. Judges' reasoning can be evaluated only
against the canned facts described in the opinion, which themselves are the
result of a factfinding process that does not inspire confidence. Parties can
reasonably believe that-given the varying sophistication of trial judges,
lawyers, and juries, the accidents of discovery, the varying credibility of
witnesses, the vagueness of the law, and so on-the chance of winning a
breach-of-contract suit is pretty much random. Skepticism about the quality
of judicial decisionmaking is reflected in many legal doctrines, including
the business judgment rule in corporate law, which restrains courts from
second-guessing managers and directors, and the many contract law doctrines that restrain courts from second-guessing parties to contracts.
These observations suggest the following possibility. Courts are not
very good at deterring opportunistic behavior in contractual relationships,
but parties are. This is why so much contractual behavior depends on
reputation, ethnic and family connections, and other elements of nonlegal
regulation, and not on carefully written and detailed contracts enforced by
disinterested courts. Part II analyzes this hypothesis more formally, and
suggests an answer to the question why, if they cannot rely on courts to enforce contracts properly, people so frequently take pains to ensure that their
contracts are legally enforceable.

21

Jeffrey E. Allen & Robert J. Staaf, The Nexus Between Usury, "Time Price," and Unconscion-

ability in InstallmentSales, 14 UCC L.J. 219 (1982).
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1I. THE MODEL
The claim behind the model is that even if courts cannot determine
who breached a contract, or whether a contract has been breached, they can
deter opportunistic behavior. This claim might sound implausible, but the
key to it is that parties choose when they want to use courts and when they
do not, so even an uncomprehending court can serve useful purposes as
long as it allows itself to be manipulated by the parties. Parties use the
courts as a commitment device, which allows them to make credible promises
to perform an action and allows them to rely on the promises of the other.22
The argument has two steps. First, I claim that nonlegal sanctions deter breaches when the payoff to the breaching party from breaching is not
too high. The standard repeated prisoner's dilemma model explains such
run-of-the-mill commercial cooperation, which is no doubt the most common kind of cooperation. The law is needed only for ensuring cooperation
when the payoff from breach is relatively high. Second, I show that when
the payoff from breaching is high, parties can protect themselves ex ante by
entering a legally enforceable contract. But the protection does not result
from the ability of courts to punish the party that breaches. It is assumed
that courts are not able to acquire the information that they would need in
order to determine liability and harm. The protection results because the
victim of the breach, if he cares about his reputation, can credibly threaten
to inflict mutual harm by bringing a negative-sum lawsuit.
A. Some Preliminaries:How People Cooperate
The model relies on the assumption that people are able to cooperate in
diverse settings. To understand this assumption, imagine that contractual
relationships take the form of prisoner's dilemmas. Seller offers a customized widget of a certain quality, and Buyer offers to pay on delivery. Seller
fears that Buyer will breach by refusing to accept delivery and holding out
for a lower price; Buyer fears that Seller will breach by selling the widget to
a third party who offers to pay more. If the parties cannot provide assurance that they will not breach, they might not enter the contract in the first
place. The neoclassical or traditional law-and-economics view is that contract law provides this needed assurance. If one party breaches, the other
party will have a remedy. So a party will not breach, or if he does, the victim will not be injured. With this assurance, Seller has the proper incentive
to invest in the customized widget, and Buyer has the proper incentive to
invest in anticipation of delivery.
But this description of contract law is highly idealized, and we will not
rely on it. We will assume to the contrary that courts are radically incompetent, so they cannot enforce promises in an accurate way. But we also as22

The term, and the basic insight, come from THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF

CONFLICT 24-28 (1960).
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sume that run-of-the-mill cooperation is possible in the absence of the
courts and the law. There are many explanations for how people are able to
cooperate in the absence of legal sanctions, and this is not the place to survey them. One common explanation is that when people have repeated interactions with each other, they have an incentive not to breach or "cheat"
in one interaction, because then people will not trust them in later interactions. In the simplest case, Seller does not break her promise to deliver the
customized widget, because Buyer is a valued customer, and she does not
want to lose him. Seller expects that Buyer will place periodic orders for
additional widgets in the future, but only if Seller has not breached in the
past. Buyer similarly does not break his promise to accept delivery, because he expects to place additional orders in the future, and anticipates that
Seller will refuse to deliver if Buyer has breached in the past. Because each
party invests in the relationship-Seller, by customizing to the Buyer's
needs, and Buyer, by modifying his factory in anticipation of the Seller's
products-each party prefers performance by the other to whatever substitute may be available on the market. As long as both parties value future
payoffs to a sufficient degree and as long as the value of breach is never too
high, it is possible (as a matter of theory) and likely (as a matter of common
sense) that they will not breach in any round.
The argument can be extended. Buyer might not anticipate purchasing
additional widgets from Seller, but does expect to purchase additional
goods from other sellers, and these sellers are likely to hear about Buyer's
past interaction with Seller. Buyer does not breach his contract with Seller
because he fears that if he does, these other sellers will refuse to deal with
him, cutting him off from important sources of supply in the future.
The model has two important implications, both of which have been
mentioned. The first is that cooperation is more likely when parties have
low discount rates.23 I will say a little more about this point below, but it
has little to do with the main argument of this paper. The second implication is more important. The threat to retaliate can deter opportunism in the
repeat prisoner's dilemma only if the payoff from opportunism is not too
high. Suppose the contract price for the widget is $10 in the example
above; Buyer anticipated that he would value it at $12 when it is delivered,
and thus would obtain a profit of $2. In fact, because Buyer's own customers reduce their orders for the product for which the widget is an input,
Buyer's valuation of the widget falls to $9 and thus his profit from his
transaction with Seller is -$1. Buyer would like to breach but understands
that, under the contract, he bore the risk of fluctuation of the cost of inputs.
More relevant, he knows that if he breaches in order to save $1, he can expect Seller to refuse to deal with him in the future, and this will cost him,
2 "Discount rate" refers to the extent to which a person values future payoffs relative to current
payoffs. A person with a high discount rate values future payoffs much less than current payoffs; a person with a low discount rate values future payoffs only a little less than current payoffs.

94:749 (2000)

ContractLaw andRadicalJudicialError

say, $5 in future profits, in present value terms. Buyer absorbs the loss and
declines to breach, because future payoffs worth $5 exceed the current savings of $1.
Alternatively, suppose that Buyer's valuation plummets to $0, perhaps
because his employees strike. Now the Seller's threat of retaliation will not
deter Buyer from breaching the contract. If Buyer breaches, he saves $10,
which is higher than the $5 he would lose as a result of Seller's retaliation.
This is an example of what I will call high-value opportunism, which is defined as opportunism that cannot be deterred by the threat of (nonlegal) retaliation. The earlier case is an example of low-value opportunism, which
will not ordinarily occur because of nonlegal sanctions.24
There are additional complexities that need not detain us for long. I
will just mention here what I have argued elsewhere, 2 that much of the odd
and interesting behavior associated with contracting is explained by the importance of signaling that one is a "good cooperator," or, in terms of the
model, that one has a low discount rate. In the model, everyone has private
information about his own discount rate. Those with low discount rates
want to persuade others that they have low discount rates, because that
makes them attractive contractual partners-the kind who is unlikely to
cheat in the repeated prisoner's dilemmas. Those with high discount rates
want to persuade others that they also have low discount rates, because if it
is revealed that their discount rates are high, no one else will want to enter
relationships with them. These assumptions produce a phenomenon known
as "signaling," in which the good types take costly, nonproductive actions
in order to distinguish themselves from the bad types, on the assumption
that the bad types lose more from imitating these actions than they gain by
entering relationships and cheating other people.
The various behaviors I described above-dinners, lunches, parties,
clubs, gift-giving, charitable activity, and so -on-are consistent with the
signaling theory. They are expensive, and although people may enjoy these
activities, there is little reason to believe that they engage in them just because they enjoy them. Most people would rather go to dinner with their
(real) friends than with their business associates; most people taken out to
dinner with their business associates would prefer the money value of the
meal. But cash gifts cannot serve as a signal because of their fungibility. If
X gives cash to Y, then X cannot know whether Y is attracted to X for X's
business or for X's money. Both sides must waste time, effort, and money.
These wasteful actions constitute what might be called commercial culture,
the idiosyncratic activities that accompany all commercial behavior despite
not directly generating value and in fact having the opposite effect.

24 See Posner, Regulationof Groups,supranote 14, at 155-61.
2 See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (forthcoming 2000); Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Sig-

nals, and SodalNorms in Politicsand the Law, 27 J.LEGAL StUD. 765 (1998).
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The signaling theory has little to do with the model I discuss in this paper, but I mention it because it suggests why the traditional model of contract law is inadequate. If it were true, we would not observe the
commercial behavior that we see in the real world. Parties would not try to
become friends, exchange gifts, mix commercial and social activities, form
clubs and associations, and so on, if they could rely on the courts to deter
opportunism in contractual relationships. They would not be offended by
breaches but be indifferent between breaches and remedies. They would
not shun people who have proven unreliable in past contracts, because they
could rely on courts to deter unreliable behavior in future contracts. Indeed,
the standard conception cannot explain why reputation is the central element of commercial transactions, why so much of commercial success is
tied up with the creation and preservation of a reputation for fair play.
B. The Role of ContractLaw
So far I have explained how nonlegal sanctions deter low-value opportunism. What then, is the role of contract law? The answer is that contract law serves to deter certain kinds of high-value opportunism, even
26
under the assumption that courts are radically incompetent.
We start by defining what is meant by radical incompetence. Assume
that a legal system exists but that courts are unable to determine whether a
party to a contract has broken a promise. To be more precise, assume that a
person can ask a court to give him a remedy for breach of contract, but that
the court is so prone to error that its decisions are random as to liability,
with damages being represented by an unbiased distribution around the
amount at stake. Suppose, for example, that X cheats Y, with the result that
fifty is transferred to X at a cost of one hundred to Y. Y sues for one hundred. The court holds with fifty-percent probability in favor of X and fiftypercent probability in favor of Y. If the court holds for Y, damages will be
normally distributed around one hundred. If the court holds for X, damages
will be normally distributed around zero (with negative damages interpreted
to mean that the court holds in favor of X on a counterclaim for a positive
amount). The assumption can be understood as one of judicial incompetence or error-proneness, but it is equivalent to the assumption that whatever the intelligence and sophistication of judges, parties cannot anticipate
and contract about any contingencies in a sufficiently fine-grained way to
provide guidance to such judges.2 7 I also assume that even though a court
26 The argument is in the spirit of Williamson, who also assumes that contracts are not enforceable. See
Oliver E. Williamson, THE ECONOMC INSTtmONS OF CAPrrALISM 168-69 (1985). But Williamson focuses on private ordering, and does not have any specific ideas about the role of courts. Id. at400-01.
27 Existing work on judicial error does not make such an extreme assumption. See, eg., Richard
Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. AND ORG. 279
(1986); Gillian Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts, 23 J.
LEGAL STuD. 159 (1994).
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cannot determine whether a promise has been performed or breached, it can
determine whether the parties intended to enter a contract. I will defend this
assumption below.
Imagine that two parties, Seller and Buyer, enter a contract whose ex
ante value to each exceeds the value of the next best opportunity. The contractual relationship has the form of a repeat prisoner's dilemma, so that the
ex ante value of the contract is realized only if each party can overcome the
incentive to defect. A party always observes a defection (that is, a breach or
instance of "cheating") and can retaliate by refusing to cooperate in later
rounds. A court cannot observe a defection. In the standard vocabulary,
defections are observable but not verifiable.
Figure 1 depicts a simplified version of the relationship, one in which
only Buyer has the chance to engage in opportunism (although this is not
essential to the argument). Seller moves first by signing a contract to sell a
widget, or not. If she refuses to sign, payoffs are assumed to be zero for
each party. Next, Buyer chooses between cooperating (that is, paying for
delivery) or cheating (that is, rejecting delivery). If he cooperates, payoffs
are P for each party. If Buyer cheats, payoffs are D for Buyer and S for
Seller: D > P > 0 > S. For now, assume that the game ends at that point,
and there are no further rounds.

(P,P)

Figure 1: payoffs for (, B)
The game so far is a simple one-sided prisoner's dilemma. Buyer gains

more by cheating than by cooperating in round 2, so Seller must expect that
Buyer will cheat in round 2. Because Seller prefers zero to the sucker payoff S, Seller will not enter the contract in the first place. The result is that
the potential gain, 2P, is not realized.
As an aside, note that the solution to this problem under the traditional
approach is to direct the court to award damages to Seller if Buyer breaches,

damages equal to P - S. This ensures that Buyer will either perform (when
D + S < 2P) or breach but fully compensate Seller for his loss (so-called
"efficient breach," when D + S > 2P), in which case S will have the proper
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incentive to enter the value-maximizing contract in round 1.28 But this solution is available only if courts can determine whether Buyer breaches and
award the right level of damages, conditions that violate the assumption of
radical judicial incompetence. Under the latter assumption, cooperation is
not possible and the bad outcome, where Seller does not enter the contract
in the first place, is unavoidable-at least if the game ends at round 2.
But suppose there is a round 3, and in this round Seller has the option
to sue Buyer or not. Figure 2 depicts the game with this third round. If
Buyer cheats and Seller does not sue Buyer, the round 3 payoffs are the
same as the round 2 payoffs, namely, D and S, for the Seller and Buyer, respectively. If Seller sues, then both sides incur a litigation cost, C. The
reason is that litigation is a negative sum game: one party must pay the
other party damages or neither pays the other damages, but in either case
both parties must invest a great deal of time and money in lawyers and litigation. Because of judicial incompetence, we assume that expected damages are the same for both parties, but this assumption is not essential.

B

s

no K

(S+R-C, D-C)

(0,0)

bec

not sue

( , D)

Figure 2: payoffs for (S, B)

If these assumptions are plausible, and Seller can make a credible threat
to sue Buyer, then Buyer might refrain from cheating. Buyer's expected
payoff if Seller sues is D - C. That is, whether or not Buyer ends up win-

ning the lawsuit, he must expect that on average he will lose C, and this must
be subtracted from the payoff from cheating. When Buyer decides whether
to cheat in round 2, he compares the payoff from cheating and then being
sued (D - C), with the payoff from cooperating (P). If P > D - C, then

Buyer will cooperate. We will discuss in a moment whether C is likely to be
high enough to produce this outcome; for now, note that the fear of a lawsuit will deter Buyer from cheating if C is high enough, that is, if C > D - P.

I assume away a number of complications that are well rehearsed in the literature. The most lucid

discussion remains Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient
Breach,61 S. CAL. L. REV. 630 (1988).
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But would Buyer have this fear? Buyer would fear a lawsuit only if
Seller can credibly threaten to sue if Buyer cheats her. But one might doubt
whether Seller's threat is credible in a world of incompetent courts. Suppose that Buyer decides to cheat Seller. If Seller does not sue, her payoff is
S. If Seller does sue, her payoff is S - C. Because S - C < S, Seller will not
sue. But if Seller will not sue, then Buyer has nothing to fear and might as
well cheat, in which case the incompetent courts do not serve to deter opportunism.
To avoid this outcome, one must make another assumption. Seller
(and Buyer) cares about having a reputation among third parties for being
tough: if anyone cheats her, then she will retaliate by suing. Seller wants
this reputation, because if other buyers in the future believe it, they will not
(usually) cheat her. This reputation is credible, as long as Seller actually
sues anyone who cheats her. But now it pays Seller to sue anyone who
cheats her, as long as the short-term loss, C, is offset by the long-term gain
resulting from the future contracts in which Buyer or other buyers do not
cheat Seller. This long-term29gain, R, is the value of having a reputation for
suing people who cheat you.
Although C must be high enough to deter Buyer from cheating, C cannot be higher than R, Seller's gain from having a good reputation. If C is
too high, then Seller would not sue Buyer after Buyer cheats. Knowing
this, Buyer would cheat. Because C must exceed the difference between D
and P, it follows that if D is very high relative to P, Seller cannot credibly
deter Buyer from cheating. Buyer knows that Seller must impose a very
high cost on him, but because an expensive lawsuit would hurt Seller too
much, Seller would prefer taking the reputational hit. The availability of
incompetent courts, then, enables more cooperation than would exist in
their absence, but clearly-and intuitively--does not make full cooperation
inevitable. Put otherwise, incompetent courts will deter some of the highvalue opportunism that cannot be deterred by nonlegal sanctions, but they
cannot guarantee that the very highest-value opportunism will not occur.3 °
29 One might make different assumptions about how much information the third parties have. In the
simplest case, the third parties know who cheated. By hypothesis, this knowledge does not deter Buyer
from cheating because Buyer has a high-value opportunity. But it is enough to give Seller an incentive
to sue, and the suit is what deters Buyer. (Imagine that Seller deals with these third parties more than
Buyer does, or that Buyer's gain from cheating is high compared to Seller's loss.) In the other extreme,
third parties do not know whether Buyer cheated. If that is the case, in the current model Seller may
have no incentive to sue, because third parties do not know whether Seller is suing because Buyer
cheated her or in order to persuade them that she is tough. But real cases no doubt fall between the two
extremes. In such cases, third parties have more information about Buyer's actions than courts do but
less than Buyer and Seller do. The consequence of such partial information is to blunt the reputation
effect on which the model relies but not to eliminate it.
30 Seller will enter the contract, and Buyer will not cheat, when R> C, P> D - C, and P> 0. It follows
that contracts will occur when D < P + R. When D > P + R, Seller does not enter the contract in round 0
because she knows that the threat to sue will not deter Buyer from cheating in round 2. To sum up, there
are three possibilities. (1) D < P, in which case contracting is possible because Buyer either gains little from
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An important question is how C is determined. Notice that C is not the
same as, say, expectation damages. When Seller sues, she can spend as
much on litigation as she wants to. How much will she spend? She will not
settle with Buyer, because then she will not obtain a reputation for tough-

ness. She must spend enough that observers see that she is willing to impose enough costs on Buyer so that Buyer gains nothing from cheating. If
we make the plausible assumption that one's chances of winning a lawsuit
increase with the amount of money one spends on litigation, then Seller can
force Buyer to incur litigation costs simply by incurring litigation costs herself. To prevent Seller from winning, Buyer will try to match Seller, thus
keeping the odds of prevailing as even as possible. So Seller will choose C,
such that C > D - P. But because Seller will not spend more on litigation
than she could gain from an enhanced reputation, she will choose C, such
that C < R. In sum, Seller will choose C in the range (D - P, R).
Note that Seller's expenditure on C is, as game theorists say, "off the
equilibrium path." Under the model's assumptions, it will not happen. If
D < P + R, then Buyer will not cheat, because Seller's threat to sue, and
thus to impose litigation costs as great as Buyer's gains from cheating, is
credible. If D > P + R, then Seller will not enter the contract in the first
place, because she knows that she will not be able to deter Buyer from
cheating. Of course, in the real world Seller does not have perfect information, will sometimes enter contracts despite the fact that D > P + R, and will
sometimes sue even though the net present value of the suit is less than
zero. Then litigation will occur unless the parties settle; but sometimes the
parties will not settle because of the same imperfect information that causes
Seller to enter the contract in the first place. But as long as parties do not
err too often, they can rely even on radically incompetent courts to deter
certain forms of high-value opportunism.
Now return to the assumption that the parties can choose whether or
not their relationship will be subject to legal intervention. This assumption
is necessary to the argument. If a party could involuntarily be subject to
contractual liability, or if parties could not choose to be contractually liable,
then people would have an incentive to make fraudulent claims that strangers have entered contracts with them as a way of extracting value from the
strangers. In addition, a party always has an interest in binding the other
party but not himself. Seller might be willing to enter a legally binding
contract with Buyer; but Seller would prefer a legal relationship in which
she (the Seller) is not bound and Buyer is. So if Buyer cheats, Seller can
credibly threaten to sue Buyer. But if Seller spots a good opportunity to
cheat, she can cheat without fearing a lawsuit from Buyer. To prevent these
results, it must be the case that our incompetent court is not too incompedefecting or because nonlegal sanctions are effective ("low-value opportunism"); (2) P < D < P + R, in
which case contracting is possible because of incompetent courts; and (3) D > P + R, in which case contracts are not possile.
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tent: it must be able to distinguish a legally binding promise from a nonbinding promise. Courts are too incompetent to fill gaps in contracts, but
not too incompetent to determine whether the parties intended to make legal
remedies available to each other.
Is this a plausible claim? The answer turns on an important difference
between the desire to subject oneself to legal enforcement, which is a binary
yes/no issue, and the desire to accomplish some cooperative goal, which involves constantly shifting and always idiosyncratic positions. Courts can,
in advance, state that certain signals will be interpreted as the expression of
a desire to subject oneself to legal enforcement, and they can pick those
signals that they find easiest to interpret. If courts announce that a seal is a
signal of a desire for legal enforcement, the parties can unambiguously signal their desire for legal enforcement by attaching a seal to their written
contract. If courts say that a writing alone is necessary, the parties can use a
writing. By contrast, courts can only with difficulty state that certain
promises will be interpreted in one way while other promises will be interpreted in another way, because there are too many kinds of promises that
parties might find valuable in a particular business context.3 1
A crisp example of this phenomenon--confidence in courts' ability to
evaluate the use of form but not to determine obligations and evaluate performance of them--comes from family law. Most people believe that
courts have little ability to evaluate an ongoing marital relationship. The
evolving obligations are too complex for an outsider to understand. Although courts and other agencies intervene more in family relationships
than they did in the past, it remains true that families enjoy a great deal of
autonomy. If dissolution of marriages is easier than before, courts no
longer try to determine who is at fault. But-now, as in the past-parties
are required to commit or not commit themselves to legal enforcement by
either getting married or not getting married. It is thus assumed that courts
can determine whether two people are married. We see here the sharp distinction between the assumption that courts can understand the use of form
to signal an intention to enter a legal relationship and the assumption that
they cannot understand the obligations that arise within that relationship.
C. Summary
Radically incompetent courts can deter high-value opportunism that
ordinary nonlegal sanctions cannot deter, but only under the following conditions. First, the promisor (the party facing the decision whether to engage
in high-value opportunism) must receive a higher payoff from performing
than by breaching and incurring litigation cost C. Second, the promisee
must gain more (in the form of future business) by maintaining a reputation
31 The contrast is a bit overstated. Courts do state that certain promises will be interpreted in certain

ways. For example, they often say that if an employment contract does not provide expressly for tenure
or termination for cause, it will be interpreted as employment at will.
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for toughness than by avoiding the cost of litigation. Third, the third parties
must have at least partial information about who engaged in opportunism if
such opportunism occurred. Fourth, the court can determine whether the
parties intended to be legally bound with greater-than-zero accuracy.
The model of contract law that I have described does not put great demands on the courts. It is as though two parties to a relationship agreed that
if they had a dispute, both parties would have a finger chopped off by a
government agent. Neither party cheats, because he believes that the other
would retaliate by invoking his right to have the mutual sanction imposed.
The cheated party will credibly retaliate with a lawsuit, because otherwise
he risks obtaining a reputation as a softy, in which case he will be unable to
avoid being cheated the next time he plays this game. The government
agent's role is just to chop off fingers if one person complains. The government is like a parent, who punishes both children who are fighting rather
than only the child who started the dispute. Even if you do not know which
child is at fault, you can discourage future misbehavior, for each child
knows that he will be punished if he engages in such misbehavior. Like the
parent, the government does not have to determine who is right and who is
wrong. The purpose of contract law is to enable parties to have the government penalize both if they have a dispute; and contract doctrines merely
give parties a reliable way to indicate ex ante their desire for such government involvement, and to limit the size and the variance of the penalty to
something close to what should be sufficient: a finger rather than a head.
This theory answers the question why, if nonlegal sanctions are so
powerful, people take care to ensure that their contracts comply with the
formalities of contract law. The answer is that although nonlegal sanctions
are powerful, they cannot deter defections when the benefit from defection
is high enough. When this occurs, the injured party benefits from the contract even when it is incompetently enforced. And both parties, not knowing in advance whether they will be injured or benefited by the price
change, agree to the contract in order to protect themselves from defection.
If this view of contract law seems improbable and perverse, consider
the similarities between the role it assigns to the courts and the historical
role of related institutions. An early remedy for legal wrongs was the trial
by battle, which entitled the complainant to face the defendant in a tournament. And an extremely important non- or semilegal institution for dispute
resolution-in every major country and in every period of history before the
twentieth century-has been the duel. Both forms of dispute resolution
present the following puzzle. If the outcome of the dispute depends on skill
with arms and not on the reliable discovery of fault, then the tournament
and the duel do not deter opportunism but give skillful people a license to
do whatever they want, a license that, ironically, they would not want, since
then no one would trust them to keep their contracts. The history of dueling
reveals many practices that took away this advantage, including the practices of giving the challenged person the choice of weapons and, in the case
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of pistols, forcing the parties to use highly inaccurate pistols at a great distance.3 2 In the Icelandic holmgang, dueling parties wore so much armor
that death was rare.33 By analogy, efforts over time to make courts harder
or easier to use, to make the liability rules more or less expansive, to make
damages more or less generous-all of this is like increasing or reducing
the distance between duelists, modifying the weapons they use, adding or
subtracting the armor they wear, and so on. These practices made the outcome of the duel a matter of luck, much as the outcome of a dispute before
a radically incompetent court is a matter of luck.
Aleatory dispute resolution mechanisms like trial by battle, dueling,
and modem contract law may well be functional. They persist over time
because they serve social purposes. They succeed for two reasons. People
do not cheat because they fear being subject to enormous losses; they do not
settle because they fear being thought to be cowards.

mII.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

A. Form
The value of a legally enforceable promise as a commitment device
depends on the freedom of parties to opt into or out of legal liability. The
ability to impose legal liability on a stranger without ex ante consent would
give people the ability to use courts strategically to extract wealth from each
other. This was a problem with the duel: a highly skillful person or a riskpreferring person can threaten to challenge people to duels if they do not do
what he wants them to do, and his skill or boldness enables him to overcome the element of randomness. In England, great nobles feared such
challenges from lesser nobles, and so had to isolate themselves or surround
themselves with bodyguards in order to deprive the lesser nobles of the opportunity to challenge them to a duel.34 Similarly, if X and three friends can
persuasively but fraudulently say before a jury that Y had agreed to buy
some stock at time 0 but had since breached his promise because prices had
fallen at time 1, then any con artist can use the court system in order to effect wealth-decreasing transfers from victims to himself. To prevent such
behavior, contract law must distinguish between obligations that have been
voluntarily incurred and those that are fraudulently asserted. 35 The mechanism for making this distinction is form. Courts and legislatures establish
certain forms, like the seal or the writing, as a way of indicating a desire for
32 See Warren F. Schwartz et al., The Duel: Can These Gentlemen Be Acting Efficiently?, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 321 (1984).
33 See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW, AND SOCIETY INSAGA
ICELAND (1990).
34 See V.G. KIERNAN, THE DUEL INEUROPEAN HISTORY: HONOR AND THE REIGN OF ARISTOCRACY

(1988).
31 See general Melvin A. EiSenberg, The BargainPinciple andItsLimits, 95 HARV. L REV. 741 (1982).
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legal enforcement; by violating these forms, one can indicate one's desire to
avoid legal enforcement.
Form, then, takes center stage in the commitment model, whereas in
the standard one-shot model it had been elbowed into the wings. Under the
standard model, it was understood that form is a way for parties to signal
their desire to opt into or out of legal enforcement. It was recognized that
the cost of forms is that sophisticated people can use them to bind others who
believe themselves not legally bound and to avoid binding themselves when
others believe them legally bound. The benefit of forms is that they enable
people to avoid legal liability. 6 These points remain relevant. But because
there was no theory explaining why parties would want to opt out of legal
enforcement, there was no explanation for why form mattered. Indeed, the
standard theory assumed that courts should determine optimal terms in order to fill in gaps, and as long as courts are assumed to be doing that, there
is no reason why parties would want to opt out of legal enforcement.
This is why modem writers on contracts have such trouble with people
like Holmes and Hand, who believed that parties' intentions are irrelevant
as long as their contracts satisfy formalities.37 The formalist approach
seems perverse: why should it matter if parties adhere to a form or not,
when we really care about their intentions? If a party fails to dot an "i," we
shouldn't let that tiny omission prevent us from enforcing the contract. But
this modem view assumes away the problem that form is intended to
solve-the problem of determining the parties' intentions. It assumes that
courts can determine the parties' intentions from context and common sense.
If this assumption is correct, then courts should ignore form. But Holmes's
and Hand's view makes sense under the assumption of judicial incompetence. Courts cannot read parties' intentions from context, so they must
rely on the forms that the parties choose. There is no evidence for the
modem conviction that judges can reliably determine intentions. And although courts are no longer as formalistic as they used to be, there is no
reason to believe that this trend is desirable, that judges are more competent than they used to be, or that contracts are more complex, or that the
old attitude was wrong. The modem view is based on an empirical hunch,
36 See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 2; Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
37 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (M. Howe ed., 1963).
Hand's most famous
remark on this subject can be found in Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of New York, 200 F. 287, 293
(S.D.N.Y. 1911):
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If, however, it were proved
by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the words, intended something else than the
usual meaning which the law imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some
mutual mistake, or something else of the sort. Of course, if it appear by other words, or acts, of the
parties, that they attribute a peculiar meaning to such words as they use in the contract, that meaning will prevail, but only by virtue of the other words, and not because of their unexpressed intent.
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and no more, and on38this basis contract law has slowly shed some of its
formal requirements.
The formalist approach requires that courts or legislatures choose the
form that parties must satisfy in order to convey their desire that a court intervene if a dispute arises. A historical example is the seal. In order to obtain a legal remedy for breach of certain kinds of promises, the promisee
had to produce a document that bore the promisor's stamp in hardened wax.
No doubt one could forge seals, but it must have been difficult to do so.
Because the promisor would not have placed his seal on the document unless he wanted to make himself vulnerable to legal enforcement, the seal
could serve the purpose of form.
The problem with the seal was that it was expensive and cumbersome. 39 Over the years, various substitutes emerged. For certain contracts,
a writing and a signature would serve the purpose. Again, one can forge a
signature, but doing so is difficult, and laws against forgery increased the
risk. For relatively low-value, short-term contracts, the requirements of
form are now quite minimal, but they remain significant. The contract must
be based on a quid pro quo; there must be evidence of something like an offer and acceptance; the terms of the original contract must be sufficiently
clear and definite; and so on.
It is clear, then, that the formal requirements of a contract, or of a kind
of contract, can vary across a range, from minimal to maximal. Costly form
protects people who do not enter contracts: they are less likely to be held
obliged to keep a promise they did not make. But costly form also increases the cost of business for those who want to obligate themselves.
Cheap form reduces the cost of entering contracts, but increases the risk of
being held liable through fraud or by accident. The proper tradeoff will depend on circumstances, will never be obvious, and will change as the underlying incentives change.4°
The formal requirements of a contract differ from the rules of contract
interpretation in a significant way: the former are self-correcting, the latter
are not. To see why, observe that when courts change a form, or even purport to abandon form in favor of loose standards, parties in subsequent contracts can always respond by mimicking approved contracts as closely as
possible. Even if a court says that it applies a standard, cautious lawyers
will draft the next contract with an eye toward the contract that the court
approved, because in case of legal dispute the lawyers can plausibly argue
that since the last contract was enforced, and the current contract is similar to it, the standard that approved the last contract would approve the
current contract as well. When this happens, the earlier contract sets a
38 See Eric A. Posner, The Decline of Formality in Contract Law, in THE FALL AND RISE OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 61 (F. H. Buckley ed. 1999).
39 See JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 195-99 (7th ed. 1998).
40 This is an implication of the literature on this topic, cited above. See supranote 36.
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pattern and effectively becomes a new form to which parties adhere. And
when parties want to avoid liability in the wake of expansive standards, like
that of Hoffman v. Red Owl,41 they protect themselves by requiring potential
contractual partners to issue waivers up until a contract is signed. By contrast, when courts misinterpret contracts, there is little that parties can do
except try to make their contracts more explicit, which is a costly and uncertain process.
B. Damages,Excuse
Suppose that Seller and Buyer enter a contract in which the payoff
from mutual cooperation is (100, 100), the payoff when Seller defects and
Buyer cooperates is (110, 50) or vice versa, and the payoff when both defect is (70, 70). If the court had perfect information, it might award damages equal to 50 against the person who defects when the other cooperates,
as this would compensate the loser while deterring future cheaters.
Suppose that Buyer sues for failure to deliver, and claims damages of
$X. Seller countersues, claims that Buyer breached by failing to provide
specifications, and claims damages of $X. Suppose further that Seller and
Buyer believe that the court, far from being perfect, will randomly choose
an amount in this range, that is, from -$X to $X, and that each can improve
his chance of winning $1 by spending $1 on litigation. Then Seller and
Buyer will each spend $2X in litigation in order to avoid a loss of $2X. If,
for example, Seller sues for $50, and Buyer countersues for $50, they would
each spend $100 in litigation costs.
Observe that the $100 expected cost for each party, C, serves the purpose of commitment. If each party can credibly impose a $100 litigation
cost on the other if cheating occurs, the ex ante payoff from defection is $10
(if Seller or Buyer defects) or -$30 (if both defect), which is lower than the
ex ante payoff from cooperation when the other person cooperates, which
remains $100. Ex post, the parties face a strong incentive to settle for an
award of $0, rather than spend $100 each for an expected gain of $0, but
they resist this incentive in order to maintain a reputation for toughness.
Although this result is good, it is not optimal. Commitment would be
possible if the parties could agree not to spend more than $11 to litigate,
since this amount exceeds the $10 payoff from defection. When parties are
unable to settle, they will spend $200 when they should spend no more (or
less) than $20, and ex ante an agreement that required a joint payment of
$20 in case of any dispute would provide adequate deterrence without risking mutual annihilation should a dispute nonetheless occur. But the parties
could not make such an agreement ex ante; and ex post any agreement to
settle might be taken by observers to indicate that the parties are not tough

41 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
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and can be exploited in the future. This would be like two duelists agreeing
that they will fire at each other with cap guns.42
Several features of contract law mitigate this problem. Contract doctrines strictly limit the size of damage awards. 43 Examples of such doctrines include the Hadley rule, the penalty doctrine, and rules that prohibit
awards for emotional or speculative losses. Thus, the parties would not expect the court to award them between -$50 and $50, but to award them an
amount in a narrower range. Thus, they would not spend $100 each on litigation, but say $90, $80 or less.
In addition, the excuse doctrines limit contract liability, and these
doctrines serve this desirable purpose even if, consistent with my assumption of judicial incompetence (and, many would say, with the case law),
they are applied randomly. The reason is that if the range is, say, -$80 to
$80, the excuse doctrine means that occasionally courts will award $0
rather than -$80 or $80. This reduces variance and thus, if the parties are
risk-averse, C. 44
All of this might seem like awfully rough justice, but that may be the
best we can do in an imperfect world. Dueling was also rough justice. The
rules of dueling, including the use of seconds to intervene, the insertion of
elements of chance to even out differences in skill, and the reliance on
weapons that reduce the risk and amount of harm, are elements that, like
contract doctrine, preserve the deterrent effect of the institution while ensuring that harm does not exceed by too much the amount necessary for this
deterrent effect. Contract law is best understood as a modem version of dueling, indeed an improvement insofar as it eliminates the need for violence
and physical harm, reduces the variance of the outcome, and reduces the
role of factors, like martial skill, that are irrelevant to contracting.
C. InterpretingContracts
If courts are radically incompetent, they should not bother trying to interpret contracts or providing reasons for their decisions, but should instead
flip a coin. They clearly do not do this. They may decide randomly, but if
they do, one must explain why they bother to invent an elaborate justification for the outcome. Why not render a judgment without providing reasons? To answer this question, one must first recognize that because we do
not claim that courts decide matters of form randomly, the use of reasons to
explain such matters does not present a puzzle. If we assume that courts can
42 As noted above, technically this behavior is off the equilibrium path, but would occur in a model
in which the parties (more realistically) have imperfect information and make mistakes.
43 Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer SupracompensatoryRemedies: An Analysis of
ContractingforDamageMeasures, 100 YALE L.J. 369 (1990).
44 The argument assumes that Seller obtains R simply if she sues Buyer after Buyer cheats. One
might alternatively assume that R is an increasing function of C, because future parties are more likely
to be impressed by Seller's toughness when Seller spends a lot on litigation rather than a little.
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adequately decide whether a contract satisfies formalities, then they should
give their reasons in order to provide guidance to parties in the future.
The puzzle concerns the judicial practice of explaining why the promisor's performance either satisfies or violates the contract. It is interesting to
note that in the old days, courts did not perform this function, leaving it instead to the jury; and even today, that often remains the case. But courts
cannot avoid performing this function when the contract must be interpreted, and when parties attempt to overturn a jury's decision or prevent the
jury from making a decision. The jury, of course, can be considered a randomizer par excellence.
In any event, the answer is clear as long as judges are not perfectly incompetent but occasionally right. Even if they are right only rarely, they
can deter bad behavior by exerting effort to discover whether the promisor
breached or not. A slightly more subtle answer is that courts like to moralize, either as a self-indulgence or as a way of providing a general sort of
guidance about what they think is good business practice.4 5 Further, if the
random element applies to factfinding but not the interpretation of the facts
in light of legal and business standards, reasoned decisions can be both random and capable of supplying useful guidance. But the general lesson of
the model is that even if we are skeptical when courts claim that a contract
means X, we can still conclude that contract law, and judicial enforcement
of contracts, serve the important social purpose of enabling parties to engage in value-generating exchanges.

45 See Edward B. Rock, Saints andSinners: How Does DelawareCorporate
Law Work?, 44 UCLA

L. REV. 1009 (1997).

